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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
STEVEN RAY ALLEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900156 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of murder in the 
second degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1986). This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court properly admit evidence of 
battered child syndrome and of defendant's prior acts of abuse of 
the victim? Evidentiary rulings are reviewed on appeal under a 
correction of error standard; however, the trial court's 
subsidiary factual determinations will be given deference and 
reversed only if clearly erroneous. State v. Ramirez. 159 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (Utah April 23, 1991). An erroneous 
evidentiary ruling will not result in reversal of a conviction 
unless the admission resulted in prejudice to the defendant. 
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). 
As sub-issues to this point, did the court properly 
deny a motion for bill of particulars, a motion to elect and a 
motion for a general verdict form with special interrogatories? 
These are issues of law dependent upon the trial court's 
subsidiary factual determinations. As such, the rulings are 
reviewed on appeal under a correction of error standard; however, 
the trial court's subsidiary factual determinations will be given 
deference and reversed only if clearly erroneous. State v. Bell, 
770 P.2d 100, 104 (Utah 1988); State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136, 
1138 (Utah 1977). Accord State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
16 n.3. 
2. Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's 
motion to suppress and properly admit into evidence defendant's 
confession? This is an evidentiary issue, reviewable on appeal 
under the Ramirez standard enunciated in paragraph 1. 
3. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 
requests for jury instructions on the lesser included offenses of 
negligent homicide, aggravated assault and child abuse? Whether 
a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction 
is a question of law and is reviewed on appeal under a correction 
of error standard. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989). 
4. Did the trial court properly admit into evidence 
autopsy photographs of the victim? Evidentiary rulings are 
reviewed under the Ramirez standard enunciated in paragraph 1. 
5. Did the trial court properly admit testimony of 
2 
defendant's partial destruction of a diary which contained 
information relative to defendant's conduct toward the victim? 
The applicable standard of review is the Ramirez standard stated 
in paragraph 1. 
6. Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to 
sustain defendant's conviction for murder in the second degree? 
A jury verdict should be viewed in the light most favorable to 
upholding it and will only be reversed when reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 
1141, 1147 (Utah 1989). 
As sub-issues of tnis point, did the trial court abuse 
its discretion in denying defendant's motion to arrest judgment 
and motion for new trial? The trial court's decision to grant or 
deny a motion for new trial will only be reversed "if there is no 
reasonable basis for the decision." Crookston v. Fire Insurance 
Exchange, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (Utah June 28, 1991). 
7. Did the trial court commit multiple, substantial 
errors such that the doctrine of cumulative error would apply? 
No standard of review is applicable. State v. Ellis. 748 P.2d 
188, 191 (Utah 1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules for a determination of this case are set out in the body of 
this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 10, 1988, an information was issued against 
defendant for the crimes of child abuse, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (Supp. 1986), and murder in the second 
degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-203 (Supp. 1986) (R. 10-12, 28-29). On August 12, 1989, 
defendant was arrested (R. 31-32; T. 595). On February 12, 1990, 
the court granted defendant's motion to sever for trial the child 
abuse counts from the murder charge (R. 92-93, 248, 430). 
From February 26 through March 2, 1990, a jury trial on 
the murder charge was held before the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, 
Seventh Judicial District Court, Grand County, Utah (R. 615-22). 
A guilty verdict was returned as charged (R. 614). Defendant 
moved to arrest judgment on the basis that the evidence was 
insufficient for conviction (R. 623-28). On March 12, 1990, the 
motion was denied and defendant was sentenced to the statutory 
term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison (R. 629, 630-
32). Defendant then moved for a new trial on the basis of 
insufficient evidence and claims of erroneous trial evidentiary 
rulings (R. 634-41). The motion for new trial was denied (R. 
660). Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal (R. 673). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant, Steven Ray Allen, is a college graduate with 
a degree in Russian and knowledge of three other foreign 
languages (T. 704-05). He served with the Intercept Intelligence 
Gathering Commission of the United States Air Force and was 
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employed by the Idaho Nuclear Energy Air Laboratory (T. 704-06). 
In 1982, he abandoned his employment, sold or gave away all his 
possessions, "headed for the high country" and opted to live the 
"reclusive lifestyle" of a mountain man (T. 707). Except for the 
time pertinent to this case, he continued to live as a mountain 
man until his arrest in 1989 (T. 707-08, 710). 
In September, 1986, defendant met Deborah Barrie in 
Moab, Utah (T. 189, 710, 713). Divorced, Debbie had two 
children, three-year-old Michael and five-year-old Matthew (T. 
188). Prior to meeting defendant, Michael had been a "happy 
little boy," "healthy," and "full of fun" (T. 190, 719-20). By 
December 16, 1986, Michael was dead (T. 361). 
Within two weeks of defendant's involvement in his 
life, Michael began sustaining injuries. In early October, 1986, 
Debbie left her children alone with defendant for two hours. 
When she returned, Mikie's nose, forehead and hands were scraped 
and he had a bump on his forehead. Defendant said Mikie had 
failed to put his hands out and catch himself as he was falling 
(T. 191). That night, Mikie appeared withdrawn and would not 
join his family and defendant. This was unusual for Mikie (T. 
192). 
Defendant moved in with Debbie (T. 196). Immediately, 
they began arguing about the children. Defendant viewed Mikie 
and Matthew as undisciplined. He did not think that Debbie 
neglected the children because, in his words, they were 
"healthy," "fairly happy," "normal" boys, but he believed that 
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she failed to sufficiently control them (T. 719-20). Debbie, in 
part, agreed but thought defendant was too "gruff," especially 
with Mikie. After defendant "hostile[ly]" insisted that Mikie 
wear a cow bell around his neck so he would not get lost, Debbie 
tearfully confronted defendant. Defendant responded that the 
boys were "damn bawl babies" and that "he had put up with enough 
bull shit in his life; that he wasn't about to put [up] with any 
more from a little kid; that he wanted to have a relationship 
with [Debbie], but things needed changing with [the] kids" (T. 
193-94). 
Others also observed defendant's hostile manner towards 
Mikie. Matthew Barrie testified that at first Mikie and he liked 
defendant. As long as Debbie was around, defendant would treat 
the boys nicely. But when she was gone, defendant would "be mean 
to us and kick us and be really mean" (T. 320-21). Matthew 
observed defendant hurt Mikie on several occasions, usually by 
punching Mikie in the stomach (T. 320-21). Once, Matthew saw 
defendant punch Mikie in the chest area and knock him down (T. 
321, 322-23). More than once, Matthew saw defendant kick Mikie, 
usually with his hiking shoes in the "bottom" but sometimes up 
farther (T. 324). Matthew observed bruises on Mikie's back and 
stomach. Mikie appeared scared and would cry after defendant 
"beat him up," but never talked about the incidents with his 
brother (T. 320-22). Defendant was the only person Matthew saw 
hurt Mikie in this way (T. 328-29). 
Martha Sullivan, Mikie's twelve-year-old cousin, saw 
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defendant hurt Mikie (T. 349f 353). The first time was when 
Mikie dug a hole outside and went to the bathroom. Defendant got 
mad, grabbed Mikie by the shoulders and hair and shook him. 
Defendant then dragged Mikie and lifted his feet off the ground 
(T. 350-51, 354-56; Exhibit 12). The next day, Mikie told Martha 
that defendant had been "mean" to him and had pulled his hair 
"really hard" (T. 351; Exhibit 12). Another time, when Mikie 
would not stop crying, defendant angrily forced Mikie to sit in 
the snow, clad only in his underwear (T. 352). 
Mikie changed. He expressed reluctance to stay alone 
with defendant (T. 194-5, 207). He would cringe if picked up 
under his armpits (T. 203). Mikie developed a bald spot the size 
of a silver dollar on the back of his head. He had numerous 
bruises over his body. His balance and eyesight seemed poor. He 
complained of stomachaches and headaches (T. 203-04). He became 
"clingy," "would cry a lot" and was unusually silent (T. 203-04). 
Debbie and defendant continued to disagree over the 
children's discipline (T. 197). Debbie observed bruising on 
Mikie's "butt" and confronted defendant. Defendant said that 
when Mikie failed to help him carry some wood, he had kicked him. 
Defendant claimed "he had been bare footed, and he hadn't done it 
that hard or that many times" (T. 198). He stated that Mikie 
must have something medically wrong with him to bruise as he did 
(T. 199). Subsequently, defendant admitted to Debbie that he had 
kicked Mikie with his boots but insisted that it was "not that 
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hard" and that his shoelaces must have caused the injuries (T. 
202). 
As Mikie continued to exhibit bruises and lack of 
balance, Debbie decided to take him to the doctor (T. 204). The 
doctor asked Debbie to explain the numerous bruises; she 
responded that she had hoped he would. Laughingly, the doctor 
suggested that Mikie had been "shoved . . . off the roof" (T. 
204-05). The doctor pressed on Mikie's stomach and spine but not 
his rib area. No x-rays were taken. A suppository and Tylenol 
were prescribed (T. 205-06). When Debbie told defendant that the 
doctor had found nothing wrong with Mikie, defendant said, "See, 
I told you he was playing little games with you" (T. 207). 
In late November, defendant and Debbie bought a 
motorcycle (T. 207). When defendant asked Mikie to come for a 
ride, Mikie declined and started crying. Defendant told Debbie 
to "boot [Mikie's] butt." Reluctantly, Mikie went (T. 207-08). 
When they returned, Mikie was crying and silent. Debbie asked 
why Mikie was crying. Defendant responded, "Why? He was happy 
with me" (T. 208). When Debbie asked again, defendant told her 
that he had hit some loose gravel and tipped over the motorcycle 
but that neither one of them got hurt (T. 209). Debbie examined 
Mikie and found a bump on his forehead, general scrapes and his 
eyes were not focused. She thought he had a slight concussion 
(T. 209). 
On December 14, 1986, two days before he died, Mikie 
starting crying early in the morning. When Debbie was unable to 
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stop the crying, defendant grabbed Mikie and took him to the 
basement (T. 209-10). Debbie followed when she heard muffled 
sounds (T. 210). She saw defendant hanging Mikie by the hood of 
a coat. Mikie's face was red and his eyes were bulging. He was 
not struggling; his arms and legs were limp (T. 210, 211). 
Debbie testified that defendant 
had Mikie hanging over his right shoulder. 
Mikie's back was to Ray's [defendant's] back. 
And I ran around and I grabbed Mikie, and I 
yelled at Matt — at Ray: "He can't breathe. 
Let go of him." And he said: "I know." And 
I said: "Let go. He can't breathe." And he 
said: "I don't care." And I said: "I know 
you don't care. Let go." And finally he let 
go. 
(T. 210). Debbie carried Mikie to her pickup and left (T. 210). 
She returned that night (T. 211). Debbie and defendant 
fought. Debbie said he was too rough with the children, that he 
was bruising them and that he was not to touch them again (T. 
211). Defendant apologized but angrily told her, "That little 
three-year old is bugging me, and nobody fucks with me" (T. 212). 
Defendant admitted that he had backhanded Mikie, knocking him 
"really hard" onto the basement's cement floor (T. 212). 
Defendant said that if he was not going to be allowed to 
discipline Mikie, Debbie better keep him "out of his face" (T. 
212). He said she was undoing everything that he had done with 
the children. He wanted to love the children and be their "new 
daddy" but could not if they viewed him as a "monster." He 
claimed Debbie was stopping him from being the "boss" (T. 212). 
The next day, the argument continued. Defendant 
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claimed Mikie was coming between them. Debbie asked, "Well, what 
do you want me to do, put him up for adoption?" Defendant made a 
"hostile" reply (T. 213). In the afternoon, Matthew overheard 
defendant tell Mikie that he hated him (T. 214). 
The next morning, December 16, 1986, defendant, Debbie 
and the children drove to Moab (T. 215, 751). When Debbie went 
into the library, the others stayed in the truck. Mikie sat on 
defendant's lap and appeared happy. Next, they went to a store 
and Mikie got some candies. Debbie still wanted to shop so they 
went to the Yellow Front store (T. 216). 
Debbie had intended for both boys to go into Yellow 
Front with her. But when they got there, defendant "winked" at 
her and suggested that Mikie "spend some time with him" (T. 216-
17, 835). Mikie was unhappy as Debbie left, but he continued to 
sit in the truck and eat his candy (T. 217). Approximately five 
minutes later, defendant came into the store and yelled for 
Debbie (T. 217, 221, 760). He was holding Mikie, who was "limp 
and white" and did not appear to be breathing (T. 218). 
Debbie drove to the hospital with defendant holding 
Mikie on the passenger side. She thought defendant was 
performing mouth-to-mouth resuscitation (T. 218). They reached 
the hospital within three to four minutes of leaving Yellow Front 
(T. 221). 
Debbie ran into the emergency room for help. When she 
returned, defendant was holding Mikie but not performing 
resuscitation. A nurse and Debbie began mouth-to-mouth (T. 219). 
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Medical personnel unsuccessfully worked on Mikie, who remained 
unresponsive, until the attending physician, Dr. Robert Murray, 
declared him dead (T. 224, 359-61). 
Hospital personnel asked what had happened. Defendant 
said that he was reading and Mikie was eating his candy. Mikie 
said something and suddenly "his eyes rolled in the back of his 
head, and his mouth went tight, and he arched his back and gasped 
for air" (T. 225). Defendant thought he was choking so put his 
finger down his throat; defendant found nothing (T. 420).1 
Defendant told others that Mikie acted like he had a seizure (T. 
339-40, 362). Dr. Murray thought Mikie may have had an aneurism 
but needed to perform an autopsy to determine the cause of death 
(T. 371, 378-80). Debbie refused because she did not want "him 
to cut up [her] baby" (T. 225, 226). Mikie was subsequently 
embalmed (T. 226). 
Carrying Mikie's body with them, defendant and Debbie 
left the next morning for Idaho to bury Mikie at her family home 
(T. 226-27). That night, they stayed in Bountiful, Utah, where 
Utah authorities twice contacted them for permission for an 
autopsy. Debbie continued to refuse (T. 227-28). Defendant told 
Debbie that the police were not raising questions about her but 
about him (T. 228). Bruises which had not been apparent on 
Mikie's body in the hospital were now evident. Defendant said 
1
 Both Debbie and defendant were trained to perform 
artificial respiration; neither found any obstructions in Mikie's 
airway (T. 223, 706-07, 836). Medical personnel also found no 
obstructions (T. 362, 387). 
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the bruises appeared "funny" and "suspicious." He told Debbie 
that if she "was looking for something badf (she would] find it" 
(T. 228). 
Debbie kept a daily journal. Defendant told her that 
he had read it and that it related their fights over the 
discipline of the children. Debbie did not remember specifically 
what she had written but recalled that she had written about the 
bruises on Mikie's bottom from defendant kicking him (T. 228-29, 
198). Defendant said that if the police came back with a court 
order and searched, the journal would amount to "probable cause" 
to take Mikie's body for an autopsy (T. 228-29). Defendant 
suggested that he "rip out" several pages of the journal and 
destroy them. Debbie agreed (T. 229). 
In the morning, they continued to Idaho with Mikie's 
body (T. 230). Defendant suggested that Debbie could avoid any 
worries about a court-ordered autopsy by burying Mikie along the 
road or burning his body (T. 230-31). Debbie refused and Mikie 
was buried in Ririe, Idaho on December 20, 1986 (T. 231). 
Debbie remained in Ririe with her son, Matthew, and 
defendant left for the Delores River area of Idaho (T. 231-32). 
In Moab, Matthew had told his mother that defendant "punched 
Mikie in the tummy" (T. 311-313). Now, Matthew repeated that he 
had seen defendant "punch and kick Mikie" and had "similar 
things" done to him (T. 310). Debbie's attitude changed and she 
decided that she would allow an autopsy (T. 232, 310). 
Defendant returned to Ririe and reunited with Debbie 
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(T. 231-32). Debbie told defendant of her decision to allow an 
autopsy (T. 232). Defendant became angry, claiming that Debbie 
was going to great lengths "to make him look bad" (T. 233). 
Contrary to his explanation to Dr. Murray of how Mikie had died, 
defendant now told Debbie that he had been reading a book when he 
noticed that Mikie was "slumped over in his seat" and was non-
responsive. When defendant lifted him to carry him into the 
store, Mikie's "eyes were rolled in the back of his head real 
bad" (T. 233). At another point, defendant told Debbie that 
"Mikie stood up, said something, arched his back, and then just 
fell forward into [defendant's] arms" (T. 233).2 
Defendant and Debbie separated. Defendant left Ririe. 
(T.234). On April 12 and 13th, Mikie's body was exhumed and an 
autopsy performed (T. 234, 435). 
Dr. Floyd J. Fantelli, a physician and board certified 
pathologist, performed the autopsy (T. 429-35). He found that 
2
 At trial, defendant admitted that his explanations as to 
what occurred when Mikie died were inconsistent (T. 813). He 
told Investigator Hines that Mikie "just stood up, got very rigid 
and just fell over . . . [Mikie] wasn't choking or . . . 
coughing." Defendant was sure that Mikie only stopped breathing 
on the way to the hospital (T. 601). Later, in the same 
interview, defendant admitted that he had hit Mikie "in the 
stomach very hard" and that Mikie had just gone limp (T. 605). 
When Hines told defendant that he believed that he had 
deliberately suffocated Mikie, defendant responded that he could 
not believe that Hines figured out what had happened (T. 603-04). 
At trial, defendant testified that he did not know what Mikie was 
doing when suddenly Mikie stood up, "waiving [sic] wildly with 
his arms." Mikie was "gritting" his teeth but was not coughing 
or choking. He "walked over to [defendant] and fell into [his] 
arms. . . unconscious" and limp. Mikie's eyes "went over to the 
side of his head. He had a — some kind of seizure or something 
. . . [h]is back arched, flopped over in the seat" (T. 759-60). 
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Mikie had a total of eleven broken or fractured ribs, involving 
ribs 1-7 on the right side and ribs 1, 2, 5 and 6 on the left (T. 
436, 439). Most of the ribs appeared to have been fractured from 
two to six weeks prior to death. Dr. Fantelli could not 
determine if these older fractures resulted from a single episode 
or had occurred in multiple episodes within days of each other 
(T. 439, 441). However, one of the fractures, rib 7 on the right 
side, occurred within hours of Mikie's death (T. 439-41). Based 
on the bleeding at the fracture sight, Dr. Fantelli concluded 
that the fracture occurred prior to cardiac resuscitation 
efforts, in other words, before Mikie's heart stopped beating (T. 
442). The nature of the fracture was consistent with Mikie 
having been substantially hit in the chest area by an adult's 
fist (T. 443-35).3 
Mikie's body also exhibited significant bruising of 
varying ages (T. 447). Bruise 1 was a one inch by one inch 
bruise on Mikie's right temple. The bruise occurred 
3
 Dr. Fantelli and the other state expert, Dr. William 
Palmer, testified extensively concerning the "very flexible" 
nature of young children's ribs. Because children's bones are 
mostly cartilage, rib fractures are very uncommon in children of 
Mikie's age (T. 443, 531, 534). Young children normally only 
sustain rib fractures as a result of automobile accidents or 
significant trauma consistent with being struck or kicked by an 
adult (T. 443-34, 446, 531-32, 571). The doctors believed that 
it was "extremely unlikely" that a child's rib would be fractured 
as a result of the pressure exhibited during resuscitation (T. 
442-43, 535). Dr. Fantelli tested for the presence of any bone 
disease to otherwise explain the fractures but found none (T. 
444). Defendant's expert, Dr. Rothfeder, agreed with this 
testimony (T. 669-71, 679). 
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contemporaneous with Mikie's death/ It was consistent with 
pressure from a finger or thumb but the pressure needed to create 
the bruise was too great for it to have been caused during 
resuscitation (T. 448-50, 461; Exhibit 5), Bruise 12 was also a 
wfresh" bruise, occurring at the time of death. It was under the 
jaw bone, a highly unusual location for an accidental bruise. 
Bruise 12 was consistent with having been received through a blow 
or sustained pressure. Because of its unique location, Dr. 
Fantelli found it unlikely to have occurred during resuscitation. 
In fact, in hundreds of autopsies, he had never seen bruises 
occurring in the face area from resuscitation attempts (T. 451-
52; Exhibit 3). Bruises 13, 14 and 15, small finger-type bruises 
on Mikie's chest were in a knuckle-type pattern, consistent with 
a back handed blow to the chest. Again, Dr. Fantelli concluded 
that, due to their location, such bruising would be inconsistent 
with any resuscitation efforts (T. 453-55; Exhibit 2). Dr. 
Fantelli found two "marks" just behind Mikie's left eye. These 
appeared "fresh" and were consistent with having been applied 
with pressure from adult fingernails (T. 456-57, 484; Exhibit 4). 
The bruise on the chin together with the fingernail marks near 
Mikie's eye were consistent with an adult having placed his 
hand(s) over Mikie's face and applying pressure substantially 
4
 Bruising which occurs prior to death may become more 
noticeable after death. This is because as blood drains from an 
area, the contrast becomes more apparent (T. 461). In this case, 
many of the bruises evident during the autopsy were not as 
apparent at the time of Mikie's death but there is no dispute 
that Mikie's bruises pre-existed his death. 
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greater than that required in resuscitating an unconscious person 
(T. 459-60).5 
Dr. Fantelli also found an area of significant hair 
loss on the back of Mikie's head (T. 447). Because such hair 
loss is uncommon in children and Mikie had no skin disease which 
might account for it, the doctor concluded that the loss had 
occurred as a result of the hair being pulled (T. 446-47). 
Dr. Fantelli's examination was to determine a cause of 
death and not specifically to determine whether there was 
evidence of "battered child syndrome" (T. 496).6 Based on his 
lack of information concerning Mikie's family background, Dr. 
Fantelli concluded that he could not be medically "diagnostic" of 
the presence of battered child syndrome (T. 475, 479, 482).7 
However, he was "diagnostic" that the injuries occurred from 
significant trauma and were, therefore, "consistent" with 
battered child syndrome" (T. 471, 483, 485-86). None of the 
individual injuries were fatal; nor, did Dr. Fantelli believe 
5
 Mikie had numerous other bruises over his body. These did 
not occur contemporaneous with his death but were considered for 
diagnosing that Mikie was a battered child (T. 450, 462, 478-80, 
572). 
6
 "Battered child syndrome" is "composed of injuries that 
are separated over a wide span of time with varying levels of 
healing and injury" (T. 433). It is used medically to determine 
the source of "inflicted trauma," that is if a child's injuries 
are non-accidental (T. 432-33). 
7
 When a doctor renders a "diagnostic" opinion, it means the 
opinion is "certainly known" (T. 471, 475). When a doctor 
describes his findings as being "consistent" with a diagnosis, it 
means that the findings are "compatible with fthe diagnosis] 
given the circumstances that would make that particular entity 
plausible" (T. 371). 
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that the cumulative effect of the injuries caused death 
(T. 476).8 
While Dr. Fantelli was unable to determine the exact 
cause of death, he did rule out any natural causes (T. 437). He 
found no cardiac problems, no indications of seizure or aneurism 
and no injuries to Mikie's internal organs (T. 469, 500, 503). 
There were indications of cerebra edema, mild swelling of the 
brain caused by a lack of oxygen at the time of death but no 
evidence of choking or aspiration on an object (T. 463-64, 471). 
Instead, the lack of oxygen coupled with Mikie's physical 
bruising and marks were consistent, but not "diagnostic," of 
Mikie having been suffocated (T. 467-69). If Mikie had been 
suffocated by someone placing a hand over his mouth, his 
respiratory effcrts would have stopped within two to three 
minutes and his heart within another minute or so. Within a 
total of three to five minutes, Mikie would have been dead (T. 
472, 503). 
Dr. William M. Palmer, an expert in child abuse cases, 
while agreeing with Dr. Fantelli's autopsy findings, testified 
that the nature of the injuries sustained by Mikie was 
"diagnostic" of battered child syndrome (T. 518-22, 525-30). Dr. 
Palmer agreed that there was no indication of a natural cause of 
death, including any sudden infant death syndrome or cardiac 
synosis, and no indications of accidental death (T. 558-59). 
8
 The state never argued that Mikie's death was a result of 
the cumulative effect of being abused. The state's theory was 
that defendant had suffocated Mikie. 
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Similarly, he found no evidence of choking, aspirationr or 
strangulation (T. 538-39, 541, 553). While unable to be 
diagnostic of suffocation, Dr. Palmer found the physical evidence 
consistent with Mikie having been suffocated by an adult placing 
his hand over his mouth and nose (T. 552-57).9 
After his arrest, defendant was interviewed by Michael 
Hines, an investigator for the Utah Attorney General's Office (T« 
594, 595). Initially, defendant denied ever hitting or hurting 
Mikie (T. 600). Hines said he did not believe him and told 
defendant that he suspected that: 
. . . Mikie was crying because his mother and 
his brother were going into the store to shop 
for toys, and that this crying frustrated Mr. 
Allen [defendant]; and that [Hines] suspected 
that Mr. Allen got very rough with the child 
because he was crying, and this caused the 
child to get even more hysterical and cry 
louder. [Hines] suspected that Mr. Allen 
then grabbed the child by the nose and the 
mouth and held that child very hard. And 
that's what killed Mikie. 
(T. 603-04). With this, defendant's demeanor changed and he 
became very emotional and teary-eyed (T. 604-05). Defendant 
responded that he could not "believe that [Hines had] figured out 
exactly what happened. . . . I've knocked the kid around a few 
times, but I didn't — I didn't intend to kill him" (T. 604). 
When asked to restate in his own words what happened, 
9
 Defendant's expert, Dr. Rothfeder, agreed with Drs. 
Fantelli and Palmer that the physical findings in this case were 
consistent with Mikie having been suffocated (T. 674). He had no 
significant disagreement with any of the state's medical evidence 
(T. 662-63, 664-65, 665-66, 669, 671, 674, 677-78, 679-81, 682-
83, 689). 
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Mr. Allen said that Mikie tried to get out of 
the truck, and he opened the door and slid 
out. Mr. Allen said: "I grabbed him by the 
collar, and I jerked him back into the truck 
real hard,11 and that Mikie was then standing 
in the truck crying. Mr. Allen said that he 
took the back of his hand, and he 
demonstrated, and he said: "I hit him in the 
stomach very hard." In his words: "Much too 
hard for a little kid." And then Mr. Allen 
stopped. And there was a relatively long 
pause, probably ten or more seconds. And he 
said: "He just went limp and fell down." 
(T. 605).10 
Other aspects of the trial will be discussed in the 
body of this brief as pertinent to the argument. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly admitted evidence that the 
victim fit the battered child syndrome. Based on the autopsy 
findings, the issue was whether the child had died accidently or 
intentionally. Evidence of the battered child syndrome was 
probative of this determination. Likewise, the trial court 
properly admitted evidence of prior acts of abuse by defendant of 
the victim for purposes of establishing absence of accident and 
intent. 
Based on the charging document and the extensive 
probable cause statement, defendant was fully informed of the 
10
 Defendant's explanation that he had just hit Mikie "real 
hard" and he went limp was considered and rejected as a cause of 
death by the medical experts. The doctors testified that a blow 
to the chest or stomach area sufficient to cause death would, in 
addition to rib fractures, also result in trauma to the lungs, 
internal arteries, the heart, the liver, the intestines or the 
spleen (T. 445-46, 532-33, 533-34). Here, there were no internal 
injuries (T. 465-67, 537-38). 
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state's theory and had adequate information to prepare a defense. 
Therefore, the court properly denied defendant's motion for a 
bill of particulars. Defendant's motion to have the state elect 
a single legal theory on which to proceed was also properly 
denied since none of the state's theories were repugnant to each 
other. Further, defendant's request for a general verdict form 
with special interrogatories was inappropriate and therefore 
properly denied. 
The trial court correctly determined that defendant's 
confession was voluntary. Defendant was fully advised of his 
constitutional rights and knowingly waived them. Consequently, 
the trial court properly found defendant's confession admissible 
and properly allowed the confession to be admitted after the 
state had established the requisite corpus delicti. 
The court properly instructed the jury, and no error 
was committed in denying defendant's requests for lesser included 
instructions where the evidence did not permit an acquittal of 
the greater offense and a conviction of any lesser offense. 
The autopsy photographs introduced were not gruesome 
and were probative of the factual determinations in this case. 
The trial court properly determined their admissibility pursuant 
to rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The trial court properly ruled that testimony of 
defendant's conduct and statements concerning the destruction of 
evidence was not hearsay, was probative of defendant's state of 
mind and therefore was admissible. 
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Because the evidence was sufficient for conviction of 
murder in the second degree, the court properly denied 
defendant's motions to dismiss, motion to arrest judgment and 
motion for new trial. No substantial errors were committed by 
the trial court and the doctrine of cumulative error is 
inapplicable. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE 
THAT THE VICTIM FIT THE CRITERIA OF A 
BATTERED CHILD AND PROPERLY ALLOWED TESTIMONY 
OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR ABUSE OF THE CHILD. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly 
permitted the medical experts to express their opinions on 
whether the victim, Michael Barrie, fit the criteria of a 
battered child and argues that the trial court improperly 
admitted testimony of defendant's prior episodes of abuse of 
Mikie. Defendant does not raise any foundational or sufficiency 
challenge to the evidence. Instead, he claims that the state 
used the evidence of battered child syndrome to "leapfrog over 
their responsibility to prove the critical elements of intent and 
cause of death" (Br. of App. at 12) and to create an inference 
that the prior incidents of abuse were medically related to the 
cause of death (Br. of App. at 16). Defendant's argument 
misconstrues the nature of the evidence in this case and its 
permissible use. 
Factual Background. 
Mikie, an otherwise healthy child, died while alone 
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with defendant for five minutes. At the time, no cause of death 
was determined. Subsequently, an autopsy established that 
shortly before his death, Mikie received a knuckle-type bruise to 
the chest, a fractured rib, an unusual bruise under his chin and 
adult fingernail-shaped marks near his eye. Medical opinion was 
that these bruises and fracture did not result from resuscitation 
efforts. Instead, the experts agreed that they were indicative 
of an adult hitting Mikie with a substantial backhanded blow to 
the chest and of an adult holding a hand or hands over Mikie's 
mouth and nose and applying substantial pressure. The only cause 
of death consistent with the physical findings was that Mikie had 
been suffocated.11 Based on this evidence, the issue at trial 
was whether the suffocation had occurred accidently or 
intentiona1ly. 
To establish that the death resulted from an 
intentional act, the state introduced evidence that Mikie, at the 
time of his death, had numerous bruises of varying ages, a 
substantial area of missing hair, and eleven rib fractures of 
varying ages. These injuries had been inflicted at most over a 
six week period, a period of time during which defendant lived 
with Mikie. The experts testified as to the criteria for 
battered child syndrome and how the injuries found related to 
those criteria. Drs. Fantelli and Rothfelder found Mikie's 
injuries to be consistent with battered child syndrome but, 
11
 The medical findings have been summarized. A complete 
discussion with citations to the record is in the Statement of 
Facts, infra, at 13-18. 
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without additional information concerning the child's background, 
were not diagnostic of the syndrome (T. 471, 475, 479, 482-86, 
680). Dr. Palmer testified that the injuries were diagnostic of 
battered child syndrome (T. 527). 
To prove defendant's intent, the state also presented 
evidence of prior incidents of child abuse and hostile actions by 
defendant towards Mikie. These incidents were admitted pursuant 
to rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Battered Child Syndrome 
The diagnosis of battered child syndrome is judicially 
recognized in Utah. State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983). 
When battered child syndrome is admitted it "does not directly 
indicate the culpability of any particular defendant." id. at 
543. Instead, " [ t ]he pattern of abuse is relevant to show the 
intent of the act. . . . In other words, the pattern of abuse is 
relevant to show that someone injured the child intentionally, 
rather than accidently." JId. (emphasis in original). But even 
where the syndrome is found to exist, the state retains the 
burden of proving who inflicted the injuries. Accord State v. 
Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988); State v. Talbot, 665 P.2d 1274 
(Utah 1983). 
Without any specific supporting authority, defendant 
argues that battered child syndrome evidence may not be 
introduced unless the state first establishes a single, 
conclusive anatomical cause of death and that the cause of death 
is consistent with the pattern of abusive conduct (Br. of App. at 
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15-16). However, the very nature of the syndrome mandates 
rejection of defendant's argument. The syndrome calls for 
••multiple injuries in various stages of healing, primarily to the 
long bones and soft tissues and frequently coupled with poor 
hygiene and malnutrition, but peculiarly identified by the marked 
discrepancy between the clinical or physical findings and the 
historical data provided by the parents." Tanner, 675 P.2d at 
542. Thusf the syndrome necessarily involves varying types of 
unexplained injuries. It is this pattern of relevant non-
accidental injuries, and not a single type of injury, which is 
"independent, relevant circumstantial evidence tending to show 
that the child was intentionally, rather than accidentally, 
injured on the day in question." Jd. at 543. Defendant also 
asserts that the evidence of battered child syndrome 
"impermissibly tainted" defendant by allowing the jury to infer 
that the prior incidents of abuse were "factually or medically" 
related to the cause of death (Br. of App. at 16). Medically, 
Dr. Fantelli clearly stated that the older bruises and fractures 
did not contribute to or culminate in Mikie's death and the state 
did not argue otherwise (T. 476). However, the prior injuries 
were factually related to the cause of death through their 
traditional purpose of establishing the probability that "someone 
in a custodial relation to [Mikie] bore him ill will." 
Commonwealth v. Labbe, 373 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Mass. App. 1978). 
Accord People v. Jackson, 18 Cal.App.3d 504, 95 Cal.Rptr. 919, 
921 (Calif. App. 1971) (cited with approval in State v. Tanner, 
24 
675 P.2d at 542). 
Based on the facts at issue at trial and applying the 
accepted parameters for battered child syndrome evidence, the 
trial court properly admitted the experts' opinions concerning 
the probability that Mikie was accidently or intentionally 
injured. It was for the jury to determine its weight. Tanner, 
675 P.2d at 544. 
Rule 404(b). Utah Rules of Evidence 
Distinct from but corroborative of the battered child 
syndrome evidence introduced, the state also presented testimony 
concerning defendant's prior abuse of Mikie. This was admitted, 
pursuant to rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, not to show 
defendant's general disposition towards violence "but to 
establish a specific pattern of behavior by the defendant toward 
one particular child, the victim." Tanner, 675 P.2d at 546. 
Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, id. at 546. "The 
substance of the rule is . . . evidence of other crimes or civil 
wrongs that is competent and relevant to prove some material 
fact, other than to show merely the general disposition of the 
defendant, is admissible." id. (emphasis in original). In 
Tanner, this Court determined that evidence of a defendant's 
prior abuse of the victim was indeed relevant to prove "absence 
of accident or mistake . . ., opportunity, knowledge or the 
identity of the defendant as the person responsible for the crime 
charged." id. at 546-47. Accord State v. Phillips, 399 S.E.2d 
293, 299 (N.C.), cert, denied, Phillips v. North Carolina, 111 S. 
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Ct. 2804 (1991); State v. Holland, 346 N.W.2d 302, 309 (S.D. 
1984); Schleredt v. State, 311 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Minn. 1981). 
The rule 404(b) evidence introduced in this case can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Deborah Barrie testified that she had 
numerous arguments with defendant about his 
"gruff" manner towards Mikie as well as his 
bruising of her son. Two days prior to 
Mikie's death, she observed defendant 
strangling Mikie by hanging him by a coat to 
the point that Mikie could not breathe and 
was limp. See Statement of Facts, infra, at 
5-6, 7-10 for complete testimony. 
2. Martha Sullivan, Mikie's cousin, 
testified that she observed defendant angrily 
lift Mikie up by his hair and drag him across 
the room. Afterwards, Mikie told Martha that 
defendant had been "mean" to him. Another 
time, she saw defendant force Mikie to sit in 
the snow, dressed only in underpants. See 
Statement of Facts, infra, at 6-7 for 
complete testimony. 
3. Matthew Barrie testified to witnessing 
defendant kick and punch Mikie on numerous 
occasions. He stated that when his mother 
was not at home, defendant was abusive 
towards both him and Mikie. See Statement of 
Facts, infra, at 6 for complete testimony. 
Despite the fact that these incidents all occurred 
within a two month period before Mikie's dea*ch, defendant attacks 
their admissibility on grounds of reinoteness. However as 
discussed above, these incidents are not singular events but 
constitute a pattern of conduct towards the victim which began 
almost immediately upon meeting him and continued up until the 
date of his death. Just two days prior to Mikie's death, 
defendant attempted to strangle him by hanging Mikie over his 
back (T.209-210). At the time, defendant openly expressed his 
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willingness to see Mikie dead by stating that he did not care if 
Mikie could not breathe (T. 210). The next day, he told Mikie 
that he hated him (T. 214). Twenty-four hours later, Mikie was 
dead while in defendant's sole custody. 
As recognized by this Court, such incidents and 
patterns of conduct "complete the story of the crime" as well as 
establish identity, motive, scheme or plan. Tanner, 675 P.2d at 
548. It was on this basis that the trial court found the 
evidence probative under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Pursuant to rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, the court then 
weighed that probativeness against any prejudicial effect and 
properly determined that it was admissible (Motions 2/12/90 Tr. 
at 11-12, 15). Accord Tanner, 675 P.2d at 547. 
Defendant concedes that the prior incidents of abuse 
may be admissible but argues that, to be admissible, the prior 
bad acts must have occurred within days of December 16th and must 
"reasonably raise an inference that [defendant] in fact had the 
intention of committing murder or child abuse" (Br. of App. at 
11, 14). Defendant asserts that no such recent incident was 
shown. To the contrary, Deborah Barrie testified that, on 
December 14th, defendant attempted to strangle Mikie by hanging 
him over his back. See Statement of Facts, infra at 8-9. 
Applying defendant's criteria, this incident was admissible. 
Thus, even if, arguendo, the court erred in the admission of any 
of the other more minor incidents of abuse, their admission would 
not result in prejudicial error in light of the clear 
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admissibility and impact of the December 14th incident. Accord 
State v. Rocco, 795 P.2d 1116, 1118-19 (Utah 1990); State v. 
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 427-428 (Utah 1989). 
Bill of Particulars and Election of Theories 
Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly 
denied a request for a bill of particulars and a motion for the 
state to elect under what theory it was proceeding (Br. of App., 
Point 1(C), at 17). Defendant claims that, without a narrowing 
of the factual issues, he was prejudiced in that he was unable to 
adequately prepare his medical expert, Dr. Rothfeder, and was 
unable to adequately cross-examine the state's experts. The 
facts of this case belie defendant's argument. 
Under rule 4(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a 
defendant may move for a bill of particulars "[w]hen facts not 
set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a 
defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as 
to enable him to prepare his defense." But a bill of particulars 
is not intended to compel the state to disclose all of the 
evidence it intends to introduce at trial. State v. Mitchell, 
571 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1977). Nor must the state disclose the 
"exact theory on which [it] intends to proceed" at trial. State 
v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1977). What is 
constitutionally required is that a defendant receive notice of 
the "particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct" so as to 
adequately prepare a defense. State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 103-
104 (Utah 1988). Therefore, "a defendant is entitled to a bill 
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of particulars as a matter of right when the notice provided by 
the information alone is constitutionally deficient." State v. 
Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, Fulton v. 
Utah, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988). 
Here, an extensive probable cause statement was filed 
with the original information (R. 14-24). In it, the state set 
forth the factual information relative to defendant's prior abuse 
of the victim, the existence of battered child syndrome, the 
circumstances of the events of December 16th, defendant's 
destruction of the diary, the autopsy findings, and secondary 
medical opinion. Specifically, as it related to the cause of 
death, the state gave notice that: 
1. Defendant was alone with the victim for 
five minutes when according to defendant, the 
child suddenly stopped breathing; 
2. The autopsy revealed multiple injuries 
including fresh bruising and fingernail marks 
on the child's face; 
3. The autopsy revealed no evidence of any 
natural cause of death, including no 
indications of disease or seizure; 
4. Medical opinion was that the most likely 
cause of death was suffocation. 
(R. 18-20, 22-23). Subsequently, defendant moved for a bill of 
particulars seeking the cause, time, date, place, and manner of 
Michael Barrie's death (R. 65-66). The state responded in an 
extended memorandum reiterating the facts on which it was relying 
(R. 79-84), including specifically defendant's acquiescence to 
Hines' statement that he had suffocated Mikie by holding his hand 
over his face (R. 79). 
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In denying the motion for a bill of particulars, the 
court concluded that defendant was misapplying the term 
"causation." The court stated that while the state must assert 
what actions of defendant caused the victim's death, the state 
was not required to prove the exact medical cause of death so 
long as it could establish that the actions of defendant resulted 
in the death (Motions Tr. 12/19/89 at 21-23). Since the state 
had informed defendant of the general cause of death and of the 
specific acts of defendant it was relying upon, defendant could 
adequately prepare its defense. Accord State v. Strand, 720 P.2d 
425 (Utah 1986); State v. Butler, 560 P.2d at 1138. Implicitly, 
the court found that the state had met its burden of providing 
sufficient notice. State v. Bell, 770 P.2d at 104. 
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to compel the state to elect a single 
subsection of the second degree murder statute on which it would 
proceed* Defendant recognizes that the state need not normally 
elect between various statutory theories, but argues that in this 
case election should have been made because "cause and manner of 
death were not necessarily consistent with each subsection of the 
homicide statute" (Br. of App. at 18). However, defendant fails 
to articulate or argue any legal inconsistency. Instead, 
defendant appears to be arguing that the state was arguing 
varying factual theories. This is incorrect. 
Defendant was charged under all four subsections of the 
murder in the second degree statute, which reads: 
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Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the second 
degree if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes 
the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily 
injury to another, he commits an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that causes the death 
of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances 
evidencing a depraved indifference to human 
life, he engages in conduct which creates a 
grave risk of death to another and thereby 
causes the death of another; or 
(d) while in the commission, attempted 
commission, or immediate flight from the 
commission or attempted commission of • . . 
child abuse, as defined in Subsection 76-5-
109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 14 
years of age, causes the death of another 
person other than a party as defined in § 76-
2-202. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (Supp. 1986). 
Throughout the trial, the state relied on only one 
factual theory, which was that defendant had suffocated Mikie. 
If the jury believed this and found that defendant did so 
intentionally, a conviction was supportable under Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-5-203(1)(a), intentional murder in the second degree. 
However, since subsections (b) and (c) of the statute are simply 
variations of (a), a conviction would also be supportable under 
these subsections. State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 257-58 
(Utah 1988); State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162, 167 (Utah 1987). On 
the other hand, the act of deliberately holding a hand over a 
child's mouth so that the child struggles to breathe and 
eventually loses consciousness qualifies as child abuse under 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2)(a) (Supp. 1986).n The act of 
suffocation would also justify conviction under § 76-5-203(1)(d), 
the felony murder provision. Thus, under these facts, the same 
act of defendant would support a conviction under each subsection 
such that the subsections of the second degree murder statute 
were variations of each other. Therefore, the trial court 
properly concluded that no election was required because none of 
the theories were "repugnant to each other" (Motions Tr. 12/19/89 
at 15-17).13 Accord State v. Butler, 560 P.2d at 1138. 
Motion for General Verdict with Interrogatories 
Defendant argues that the court's denial of his proposed verdict 
form was error (Br. of App., Point 1(D), at 19). Pretrial, 
defendant moved for a general verdict form with special 
interrogatories (R. 261). Specifically, defendant proposed that 
the jury delineate the exact cause of death found, the act of 
defendant which resulted in the death, when and where the act was 
12
 Under the statute, child abuse is defined as the 
intentional or knowing infliction upon a child of "serious 
physical injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2)(a). Subsection 
(l)(c) of the statute defines "serious physical injury" as "any 
physical injury which creates a permanent disfigurement; 
protracted loss or impairment of a function of a body member, 
limb or organ, or substantial risk of death." 
13
 The state recognizes that this Court only addressed the 
first three subsections of the murder in the second degree 
statute in State v. Russell, 733 P.2d at 167. However, defendant 
raises no claim that the culpable mental states required for 
conviction under those subsections is necessarily repugnant to 
the mental state required for common law felony murder. See 
State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d at 257-58; State v. Tillman, 750 
P.2d at 69. The state has, therefore, limited its argument to 
the facts of this case and the issues articulated by defendant. 
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committed, the mental state of defendant, what acts of defendant 
conformed to the mental state, and whether the jury considered 
any of the prior acts of abuse by defendant of the victim (R. 
263-66). In denying the motion, the trial court stated: 
. • . the jury does not have to unanimously 
agree on various things that are contained in 
that interrogatory. I think we can do it by 
requested Instructions as to. what should be 
done. But I won't give the interrogatories 
as outlined by the particular request . . . . 
(Motions Tr. 2/12/90 at 24). Under Utah law, the ruling was a 
proper exercise of the court's discretion. State v. Bell, 770 
P.2d at 109 n.19 (there is no requirement that a court use a 
special verdict form in criminal cases). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED DEFENDANT'S 
INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS MADE TO LAW 
ENFORCEMENT. 
In his opening and supplemental briefs, defendant 
alleges that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence 
defendant's post-arrest inculpatory statements to Investigator 
Hines. In essence, defendant's arguments are: 1) that the 
statements were involuntary in violation of the fifth amendment, 
2) that the statements were made after inadequate Miranda 
warnings and in violation the sixth amendment, 3) that no corpus 
delicti was established prior to the admission of the statements, 
and 4) that the trial court entered inadequate findings in 
denying the motion to suppress. Consistent with defendant's 
brief, each ground will be discussed separately. 
The voluntary nature of the statements. 
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When a defendant objects to the admission of his 
statements to law enforcement on fifth amendment grounds, the 
state must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
statements were voluntarily made based on the "totality of all 
the surrounding circumstances." Lego v. Twomev, 404 U.S. 477, 
489, 92 S.Ct. 619, 627 (1972); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 463 
(Utah 1988). An inquiry into voluntariness is never mechanical, 
for the court must consider "both the characteristics of the 
accused and the details of the interrogation." Bishop, 753 P.2d 
at 463. But the ultimate inquiry remains the same: Did physical 
or psychological force or otherwise improper threats or promises 
"induce the accused to talk when he otherwise would not have done 
so?" .Id. at 464 n.75 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047 (1973), and State v. Moore, 697 
P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985)). 
As a basis to suppress his confession, defendant 
contended that he was "verbally and physically" abused by Montana 
law enforcement during his arrest on August 12, 1989, and that 
this conduct affected the voluntariness of his statements given 
to a Utah investigator a day and a half later (Suppression 
Hearing T. 2/22/90 at 157-158). A suppression hearing was held 
in which witnesses, including defendant, fully testified 
concerning the circumstances of the arrest and subsequent 
interview (Supp. Hearing T. 5-156). Based on this testimony, the 
trial court concluded that there was no "causal connection 
between anything that occurred at the time of [defendant's] 
34 
arrest and at the time of the interview that would influence him 
to answer questions that he wasn't otherwise ready to do" (Supp. 
Hearing T. 2/22/90 at 169). On appeal, defendant challenges this 
factual finding.14 
The evidence at the suppression hearing amply supported 
the trial court's determination. A substantial manhunt for 
defendant was conducted in the Rocky Mountain area (Supp. Hearing 
T. 6-7). Ravalli County, Montana authorities received 
information that defendant had been sighted in the nearby 
mountains. Their information was that defendant was armed and 
dangerous (Supp. Hearing T. 48, 73). On horseback and by 
helicopter, they commenced their search (Supp. Hearing T. 49-53). 
They found defendant's hurriedly abandoned camp on the Montana 
side of the Continental Divide. Continuing their search, they 
sighted a horse in the area. Believing that they were in hot 
pursuit of defendant, they followed his trail and located 
defendant on the Idaho side of the Continental Divide (Supp. 
Hearing T. 73). 
When the officers confronted defendant, he would not 
identify himself. Words were exchanged. Detective Bailey used 
vulgarities and was somewhat rough in his handling of defendant. 
14
 This Court has recently clarified that while the 
voluntariness of a confession is ultimately a determination of 
law, it is predicated on the trial court's determination of the 
facts surrounding the giving of the statement. Thus, the trial 
court's "determination of which facts to believe" and its 
"resolution of factual questions and the associated determination 
of credibility that may underlie the decision to admit" are 
"overturned only if clearly erroneous." State v. Ramirez, 159 
Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (Utah April 23, 1991). 
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Defendant was belligerent and uncooperative (Supp. Hearing T. 54-
57; R. 226-37, 437). Aside from the verbal exchange and force 
used in hand-cuffing, defendant was not assaulted or physically 
injured (Supp. Hearing T. 54). When Sheriff Jay Printz arrived 
minutes later, the situation calmed (Supp. Hearing T. 55-57). 
Much of the exchange between the arresting officers and 
defendant was tape recorded (R. 226-37). All of it related to 
the officers' attempts to identify defendant as "Steven Ray 
Allen," concerns for the officers's safety when they found a 
knife hidden in defendant's groin area, and concerns for the 
officers' safety in having to transport defendant by helicopter 
(Id.) Contrary to defendant's assertions in his brief, the 
trial court listened to the tape recording in making his 
determinations concerning the admissibility of defendant's 
subsequent statements (T. 150, 790). Because Utah had requested 
that anyone arresting defendant not interview him concerning the 
homicide, no attempt was made by the Montana authorities to 
interrogate defendant (Supp. Hearing T. 8, 145). Instead, 
defendant was held for the Utah authorities who arrived in 
Montana thirty-six hours later (Supp. Hearing T. 9, 54). 
Defendant alleged no incidents of mistreatment or abusive conduct 
after his mountain arrest. Once in the jail, he had no further 
contact with the officers who had arrested him except for Sheriff 
Printz. 
The only law enforcement official to interview 
defendant was Investigator Michael Hines, Utah Attorney General's 
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Office. Prior to commencing his questioning, Hines, in the 
presence of Sheriff Printz, gave defendant Miranda15 warnings. 
While the adequacy of defendant's waiver will be discussed fully 
in the following subsection, the trial court found that defendant 
was informed of and voluntarily waived his fifth and sixth 
amendment rights (Supp. Hearing T. 167-170). No evidence was 
presented that defendant's decision to waive these rights and 
speak to Mr. Hines was influenced in any way by the circumstances 
of his arrest. Defendant testified that he was never physically 
afraid during the interview and that Hines made no threats or 
promises to him to induce his cooperation (Supp. Hearing T. 143-
44). 
Based on this evidence, the court properly found no 
factual, and therefore no legal, connection between defendant's 
arrest and his subsequent determination to speak to Investigator 
Hines. Specifically, the court stated that even if the arrest 
was abusive in the sense of "name-calling," the arrest was "too 
far removed" from the circumstances of the interview to have 
influenced it. This was supported by defendant's own testimony 
that he was under no fear at the time of the interview (Supp. 
Hearing T. 169). Implicitly, the court rejected defendant's 
argument that the arrest had "tainted" the interview and instead 
concluded that the two events were attenuated.16 Based on the 
15
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
16
 Defendant predicates his "taint" argument on the claim 
that the Montana authorities had no authority to arrest defendant 
in Idaho and on his claim of abuse during the arrest (Supp. 
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facts, the court properly concluded that the state "had sustained 
the burden to show that there was no coercion or undue influence 
used in obtaining the statements from the defendant" (R. 545; 
Supp. Hearing T. 169).17 
Defendant also asserts that the court violated his due 
process rights in refusing to admit the tape of his arrest at 
trial. Defendant claims that the circumstances of his arrest 
were relevant to the jury's assessment of defendant's statements 
(Br. of App. at 25-26). Based on the court's prior finding that 
there was no causal connection between the arrest and defendant's 
subsequent statements, the court determined that the tape 
contained no material facts relevant to the jury's determination 
of the weight and probativeness of the statements (T. 789-94). 
Specifically, the court ruled that listening to the tape 
"wouldn't help the jury; and it openfs] so many issues where we 
Hearing T. 158-59; Br. of App. at 24; Supp. Br. of App. at 12). 
However, attenuation is not at issue in this case since it is 
clear that the officers had a legal basis to arrest defendant. 
Instead, the issue is whether factually the circumstances of the 
arrest caused defendant to subsequently speak to Investigator 
Hines where he would not have otherwise done so. Accord State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 463-64. 
17
 In defendant's supplemental brief, he argues that this 
Court should reject, on state constitutional grounds, the recent 
view of a majority of the United States Supreme Court that a 
harmless error analysis may be applied in reviewing the improper 
admission of a coerced confession. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 
S.Ct. 1246 (1991). However, it is unnecessary to reach this 
issue as defendant's statements were not coerced. 
Fulminante did not modify the law regarding voluntary 
confessions deemed inadmissible on other grounds, such as Miranda 
violations or sixth amendment claims. A harmless error standard 
has consistently been applied to these latter violations. 
Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1255. 
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might get off on a side track, whether they were correct or not 
correct, which we don't think would help in any way of disposing 
of the ultimate issues in this case" <T. 790). Additionally, the 
court viewed the tape as only recording part of the arrest and 
not the entire sequence of events (T. 794). For these reasons, 
the court excluded the tape pursuant to rule 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, in that "the prejudicial affect [sic] on the 
proceedings of the trial would greatly out weigh any relevance 
that the transcript — possibly could come from the introduction 
of this evidence" (T. 790). 
The court did not restrict defendant from discussing 
relevant circumstances surrounding the actual interview, only the 
events of the arrest itself (T. 790-94). Nor did the court 
restrict the defense from presenting relevant facts concerning 
"the physical and psychological environment that yielded the 
confession." Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689, 106 S. Ct. 
2142 (1986). The difficulty in defendant's due process argument 
is that factually defendant never claimed that he was coerced 
into making the statements. Instead, he asserted that Hines had 
misunderstood what he had said (T. 795-812). Thus, the issue was 
not the credibility of the confession but the credibility of the 
witnesses. On this issue, the circumstances surrounding the 
arrest were irrelevant. 
Miranda and Invocation of Counsel 
Defendant attacks the adequacy of the Miranda warnings 
given defendant but couples this with an claim that defendant 
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made "both unequivocal and equivocal requests" for counsel (Br. 
of App., Point 11(B) at 26-28). In making his argument, 
defendant misconstrues the facts and improperly interchanges the 
protections of the fifth and sixth amendment.18 
Turning to the Miranda issue first, prior to 
interviewing defendant, Investigator Hines fully advised 
defendant of his Miranda rights. Hines testified that he read 
the rights from a form and then elaborated and more fully 
explained the rights (Supp. Hearing T. 11-13; Exhibit 8). 
Defendant, who is college educated, responded that "he would 
chose — that he would talk to [Hines] without an attorney, but 
he would chose which questions to answer and that — which ones 
not to answer" (Supp. Hearing T. 13). The interview than 
proceeded as defendant wished, with his answering the majority of 
questions but occasionally declining to answer a particular 
question (Supp. Hearing T. 21-22). Defendant never asked to 
terminate the interview. He never asked for an attorney except 
at the conclusion of the one and one-half hour interview when he 
asked if an attorney would be provided in connection with his 
extradition (Supp. Hearing T. 18, 29, 142-43). 
18
 The giving of a Miranda warning is a procedural 
requirement to affirmatively demonstrate a defendant's waiver of 
his fifth amendment right to remain silent and his sixth 
amendment right to counsel. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 
444, 446, 94 S. Ct. 2357 (1974). However, the two rights are 
distinct. Michigan v. Moslev, 423 U.S. 96, 104 n.10, 96 S.Ct. 
321, 326 n.10 (1975). See also McNeil v. Wisconsin, Ill S.Ct. 
2204 (1991). Here, defendant admitted he never asserted his 
right to remain silent (Supp. Hearing T. 129-131, 142-43). Thus, 
defendant raises only a sixth amendment claim. 
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During the suppression hearing, defendant claimed that 
Hines never read his rights to him but admitted that some 
discussion of "Miranda" occurred. While alleging that he did not 
know what Hines was talking about, defendant testified that he 
understood that he did not have to answer any questions (Supp. 
Hearing T. 129-31). Defendant testified that he told Hines "they 
could ask the questions, but I felt that if I didn't feel the 
question was right, that I didn't feel like — unless my attorney 
told me that I should respond, that I should respond" (Supp. 
Hearing T. 131). Sheriff Printz, who was present during the 
interview, verified defendant's willingness to speak with Mr. 
Hines and his waiver of his Miranda rights (Supp. Hearing T. 65-
69). 
As to the facts concerning any requests for counsel, 
the evidence established that when defendant was arrested, one of 
the officers began, but did not finish, reciting defendant's 
Miranda rights as a matter of form (R. 227-228). However, none 
of the arresting officers questioned defendant other than to 
establish his identity and no discussion of counsel took place. 
Despite this, defendant attempts to characterize the arrest 
encounter as an equivocal invocation of counsel because at one 
point, defendant non-responsively shouted, "Read me my rights"; 
and, at another time, told the officer with whom he had been 
arguing, that he would not give him his name but would talk to 
another officer. Neither of these statements could reasonably be 
construed to even be a statement concerning counsel. McNeil v. 
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Wisconsin, 111 S.Ct 2204, 2209 (1991) (a request for counsel 
"requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be 
construed to be expression of a desire for the assistance of an 
attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police") 
(emphasis in original). 
Defendant also argues that he made an unequivocal 
request for counsel during his booking and processing at the jail 
such that Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (1981) 
should apply. But the facts do not support this claim. The 
evidence established that while being booked in the jail, a 
written form was given to defendant which advised him of his 
right to remain silent and his right to an attorney (Supp. 
Hearing T. 90-91). Defendant signed the form but made no request 
for an attorney (Supp. Hearing T. 92, 96, 140). Jail personnel 
explained their slip system whereby an inmate could make any 
written requests (Supp. Hearing T. 95-96). Defendant never made 
any written requests for counsel (Supp. Hearing T. 96-97, 140). 
The day-sergeant told defendant that he could discuss whether he 
wanted to waive extradition with an attorney. The day-sergeant 
testified that defendant made no request for an attorney (Supp. 
Hearing T. 105). 
When defendant testified at the suppression hearing, he 
claimed that while he was being booked, the jailer asked him if 
he would like to make a telephone call and asked him, "Don't you 
want to call an attorney?" According to defendant, defendant 
responded that he was not sure who to call and the deputy gave 
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him a list of attorneys (Supp. Hearing T. 127). This was 
disputed by the jailer. The jailer state that he did not discuss 
an attorney with defendant but simply told him that he could make 
a telephone call. When defendant responded that he did not know 
anyone in the area, the deputy told him that the phone book was 
there if he wanted it (Supp. Hearing T. 94-95). 
Two days later, when Hines interviewed defendant, he 
was fully advised of his right to have an attorney present but 
never requested one (Supp. Hearing T. 11-18, 152-153). 
Based on this testimony, the trial court found that 
defendant's statements that he had requested an attorney were not 
credible (Supp. Hearing T. 167-68). The court found that 
defendant had ample opportunity to request an attorney but never 
did so (Supp. Hearing T. 168). Therefore, the court concluded 
that defendant had voluntarily waived his constitutional rights 
(Supp. Hearing T. 167-70). 
The trial court's determination is fully supportable on 
the facts and fully consistent with the law. Here, based on the 
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, the trial court 
made the factual determination that defendant had made neither an 
equivocal or unequivocal request for counsel. This finding on 
credibility is entitled to deference. State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 16 n.3. The court then found that since defendant 
was provided with full Miranda warnings and knowingly waived 
them, the otherwise voluntary statement was admissible. Accord 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d at 463-467. 
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Corpus Delicti 
Defendant is correct in arguing that under Utah law, 
the corpus delicti of the crime charged must be established by 
clear and convincing evidence before a defendant's confession may 
be introduced at trial (Br. of App., Point 11(C) at 31-32). 
However, defendant misconstrues the scope of the rule. 
"The corpus delicti of murder has two components: (1) 
proof that the victim is actually dead, and (2) proof that the 
death was caused by criminal means." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 
439, 478 (Utah 1988). This second requirement does not require 
proof of the cause of death, as argued by defendant; rather, it 
is proven by evidence "that the death resulted from criminal 
conduct rather than any accident or from natural causes." Id. 
As discussed fully in Point I of this brief, the 
medical evidence established that Mikie had not died of natural 
causes. See Statement of Facts, infra, at 13-18. The battered 
child syndrome evidence further established the probability that 
Mikiers death was not accidental but intentional. Taken 
together, this was sufficient to establish the corpus. Combined 
with the observations of defendant's prior abuse of the child and 
the fact that he had sole custody of the child at the time of 
death, the evidence overwhelming provided a basis for the 
admission of defendaiftosdiirigg . 
Defendant, for the first time on appeal, attacks the 
adequacy of the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions 
of law regarding the court's determination of voluntariness and 
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Corpus Delicti 
Defendant is correct in arguing that under Utah law, 
the corpus delicti of the crime charged must be established by 
clear and convincing evidence before a defendant's confession may 
be introduced at trial (Br, of App., Point 11(C) at 31-32). 
However, defendant misconstrues the scope of the rule. 
"The corpus delicti of murder has two components: (1) 
proof that the victim is actually dead, and (2) proof that the 
death was caused by criminal means." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 
439, 478 (Utah 1988). This second requirement does not require 
proof of the cause of death, as argued by defendant; rather, it 
is proven by evidence "that the death resulted from criminal 
conduct rather than any accident or from natural causes." Id. 
As discussed fully in Point I of this brief, the 
medical evidence established that Mikie had not died of natural 
causes. See also Statement of Facts, infra, at 13-18. The 
battered child syndrome evidence further established the 
probability that Mikie's death was not accidental but 
intentional. Taken together, this was sufficient to establish 
the corpus. Combined with the observations of defendant's prior 
abuse of the child and the fact that he had sole custody of the 
child at the time of death, the evidence overwhelming provided a 
basis for the admission of defendant's incriminating statements. 
Findings and Conclusions 
Defendant, for the first time on appeal, attacks the 
adequacy of the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions 
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of law regarding the court's determination of voluntariness and 
waiver of Miranda rights (Br. of App., Point 11(D) at 32). 
Because this was not raised below, this argument should be deemed 
waived. State V. Steqqel, 660 P.2d 252, (Utah 1983). 
Even considering the merits, defendant's argument must 
fail. While a defendant is entitled to a clear cut determination 
of voluntariness, this does not mean that the court must enter 
formal written findings. Certainly, it is better form to do so. 
But here after a full evidentiary hearing, substantial briefing 
and complete argument, the trial court orally pronounced its 
rulings (Supp. Hearing T. 167-73). This included factual 
determinations as well as legal conclusions. During trial, some 
aspects of this ruling were again raised and fully responded to 
by the court (T. 789-94). 
Contrary to defendant's assertions on page 13 of his 
supplemental brief, the trial court made all necessary 
determinations. The court ruled on the issue of attenuation by 
finding no causal connection between the arrest and the 
statements and clearly resolved the credibility issues raised by 
the conflicting testimony of the witnesses (Supp. Hearing T. 167-
70). Since the trial court never ruled on pertinent factual 
issues, a remand for further findings is unnecessary. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES OF 
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND 
CHILD ABUSE WHERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT ACQUITTAL OF THE GREATER OFFENSE AND 
CONVICTION UNDER ANY OF THE LESSER OFFENSES. 
Defendant recognizes that when a defendant requests a 
lesser included jury instruction, an evidence-based standard 
applies. State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 157 (Utah 1983). This 
requires the trial court to first determine if the offcmse sought 
is a lesser included offense of the crime charged, that is, 
"whether the offense is established by proof of the same or less 
than all the facts required to establish the commission of the 
crime charged." State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986). 
If so and "the evidence is ambiguous and susceptible to 
alternative explanations," the court must instruct on the lesser 
included offense if "any one of the alternative interpretations 
provides both a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the 
included offense." Ld. It is this second prong which defendant 
misapplies in his argument that the court erred in refusing to 
give additional lesser included jury instructions (Br. of App. at 
35-36). 
The jury was instructed on murder in the second degree 
as well as the lesser included offense of manslaughter (R. 572-
74, 596, 597-99, 600, 602). On appeal, defendant does not 
challenge the propriety of these instructions. Instead, 
defendant asserts that the trial court improperly denied lesser 
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included instructions on negligent homicide, child abuse, and 
aggravated assault (Br. of App. at 35). At trial, defendant only 
specifically objected to the trial court's denial of the 
instructions on negligent homicide and child abuse, and merely 
generally excepted to "all of our instructions which were not 
given or given in another form" (T. 864). Even in objecting to 
the negligent homicide instruction, defendant only asserted that 
it "certainly would be one option that the jury should consider" 
(T. 864). When asked by the trial court to comment on the 
court's reasoning that a child abuse instruction was 
inappropriate, defense counsel indicated that he had no argument 
"other than excepting" (T. 859-60). 
When the appropriateness of a requested instruction is 
dependant on the presentation of certain evidence at trial, the 
mere pretrial submission of a written request for the 
instruction should not be viewed as sufficient to preserve the 
issue for appeal. Instead, the party offering the instruction 
must advance with specificity the reasons for its proper 
inclusion based on the trial facts. See Rule 19(c), Utah R. 
Crim. P. ("No party may assign as error any portion of charge or 
omission . . . unless he objects . . . stating distinctly the 
matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection.") 
Here, the requests for lesser included jury instructions were 
submitted prior to trial (R. 548-65). Under the Baker-Velarde 
standard, the applicability of the lesser included was entirely 
fact-sensitive and could only be determined after submission of 
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all the evidence. At that point, it became incumbent on counsel 
to affirmatively assert why such instructions were now 
appropriate. Having failed to state any factual, and therefore 
legal, reasons for the requested instructions, defendant should 
be precluded from raising the issue on appeal. Accord State v. 
Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 594 (Utah 1988); State v. Schoefeld, 545 
P.2d 193, 196 (Utah 1976). 
Even if the merits are considered, defendant's argument 
fails. To justify conviction of negligent homicide, the facts 
would have to support a finding that in causing Mikie's death, 
defendant was "unaware but should have been aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk, or that [he] failed to 
perceive the nature and degree of the risk." Boaaess v. State. 
655 P.2d 654, 655 (Utah 1982). Here, defendant denied any 
wrongdoing (T. 743, 759-60, 807-10). However, the state alleged 
that he had intentionally placed his hands over the child's mouth 
and nose and suffocated him. Under the latter facts, there was 
no basis to assume that defendant was unaware of the risk to the 
child from such culpable conduct. Therefore, under either 
defendant's or the state's theories of the case, there was no 
factual basis from which a jury could reasonably conclude that 
defendant acted with criminal negligence. State v. Standiford, 
769 P.2d at 267 (a defendant's knowledge of the risk of death can 
be derived from the nature of the injuries inflicted); State v. 
Velarde, 734 P.2d at 453 (a defendant is not entitled to an 
instruction on negligent homicide where no rational view of the 
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evidence supports it). 
Further, even assuming arguendo that a negligent 
homicide instruction would have been appropriate, any error would 
be harmless. The jury was instructed on murder in the second 
degree and manslaughter. By convicting defendant of the greater 
offense, the jury necessarily considered and rejected defendant's 
argument that he acted with any lesser mental state than that 
associated with second degree murder. Thus, defendant has not 
established "how, in light of this fact, there is any reasonable 
likelihood that if an instruction on negligent homicide had been 
given, the jury would have convicted [defendant] of that offense, 
rather than second degree murder or manslaughter." State v. 
Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah 1989). 
Similarly, the only factual basis which would allow the 
jury to acquit defendant of murder in the second degree but 
convict him of child abuse would be if the jury found that Mikie 
died from natural causes temporally and factually independent of 
the abuse. The medical evidence negated such a conclusion. 
Additionally, based on defendant's trial testimony denying any 
abuse of Mikie at the time of his death, the court expressed 
concern that an instruction on child abuse would confuse the jury 
into believing that defendant could be convicted simply on the 
basis of the prior incidents of child abuse (T. 860). The 
court's determination was proper. As long as the jury found that 
defendant had physically restrained Mikie from breathing, 
defendant was guilty of some degree of murder. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED AUTOPSY 
PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE VICTIM PROBATIVE OF THE 
CHILD'S CASE OF DEATH. 
Over defendant's objections, the trial court admitted 
five photographs of the victim taken prior to the autopsy. The 
photographs, exhibits 2-6, depict different bruises and marks on 
the body at the time of death. While defendant characterizes the 
photographs as gruesome (Br. of App. at 38), the main thrust of 
his argument is that the photographs were irrelevant to the 
issues in the case and therefore not probative (Br. of App. at 
36-37). 
This Court has held that if a photograph is found to be 
gruesome, it will generally be viewed as inadmissible unless it 
has unusually probative value. State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 
1256 (Utah 1988); State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752-53 (Utah 
1986). However, "photographs that are only negligibly gruesome 
have little potential for unduly prejudicing the jury, and their 
admission therefore does not constitute an abuse of discretion." 
State v. Valdez. 748 P.2d 1050, 1054 (Utah 1989).19 
19
 This Court has recently clarified that an "abuse of 
discretion standard" for evidentiary rulings is misleading. 
Rather, evidentiary rulings are matters of law, reviewable under 
a correction of error standard. State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 16 n.3. However, within this standard, deference has 
always been given to the trial court's subsidiary factual 
determinations. JEd. The balancing of probativeness and 
prejudice required under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, is one 
such area. id. If the trial court's factual determinations are 
clearly erroneous or its legal conclusions in error, then the 
court has abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. See 
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, No. 900112-CA, slip op. at 
3-5 (Utah App. September 6, 1991) 
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The photographs in question do not depict open wounds, 
blood or any other factor which traditionally has been 
characterized as gruesome. State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d at 1257 
(photographs of baby's neck slit open and mother in unnaturally 
contorted position in a pool of blood were gruesome); State v. 
Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.2d 512, 514 (1968) (photograph of skin 
peeled back from skull during autopsy was gruesome). The 
photographs here are of the child's intact body; only the area of 
injuries are shown. The injuries themselves are the bruising, 
fingernail marks and missing hair section. No incisions have 
been made in the body. Each photograph is small, only 3 x 5 
inches, and does not represent any "blowups" of the area in 
question. Taken alone, the photographs are not gruesome. Accord 
State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1989) (photograph of 
victim's body and wounds did not display gruesome qualities); 
State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d at 1055 (photographs of victims' bodies 
not particularly bloody or gruesome). 
At trial, each of the photographs was probative of the 
circumstances under which Mikie had died. Defendant's position 
was that he had caused Mikie no injuries; yet, Mikie died while 
in his sole custody. While not conclusive of an anatomical cause 
of death, the experts agreed that the autopsy findings were 
consistent with Mikie having been intentionally suffocated (T. 
467-69, 552-57). Under such circumstances, it was imperative for 
the jury to assess the nature and extent of the injuries about 
which the medical experts were testifying. Defendant claims that 
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a drawing was sufficient to explain the medical testimony. 
First, this assumes that the jury does not have the duty to 
independently evaluate the basis of the medical opinions. 
Second, the trial court is not prevented from admitting 
photographic evidence merely because the same information may be 
"gleaned" from testimonial sources. State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d at 
1055; State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah 1983). 
Consequently, the trial court properly admitted the photographic 
evidence. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE 
THAT DEFENDANT HAD DESTROYED PARTS OF DEBORAH 
BARRIE'S DIARY WHICH RELATED TO INCIDENTS OF 
ABUSE. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly 
allowed Deborah Barrie to testify to defendant's destruction of 
parts of her diary and to testify to the contents of the 
destroyed pages. Defendant also claims that the court failed to 
review the contents of the remaining diary before allowing this 
testimony. Defendant bases his claim of error on rule 802, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, maintaining that the testimony was hearsay 
(Br. of App. at 39). The argtoment is without merit. 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to exclude Debbie's 
testimony that one day after Mikie's death, defendant asked her 
if he could destroy parts of her diary relating to incidents of 
his abuse of Mikie (R. 194-95). The trial court denied the 
motion (Motion Tr. 2/12/90 at 18-19). The court found that 
Debbie was not reconstructing the contents of the diary but was 
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simply testifying to defendant's statements and conduct 
concerning why he wanted to destroy parts of the diary. The 
court properly concluded that the issue was not one of hearsay 
but of relevancy and could, therefore/ be renewed on the latter 
grounds at trial (Motion Tr. 2/12/SO at 19). Accord Utah R. 
Evid. 801(d)(2). 
Additionally, defendant moved for the discovery of the 
entire diary, dating from 1986 (R. 339). The state had provided 
defendant with a copy of the diary for the time period beginning 
with defendant's introduction to Debbie but not with the contents 
of the diary for the months preceding their relationship (R. 396-
99). In camera, the court reviewed the entire dairy to determine 
if any of the previous parts entries contained information 
exculpatory to defendant or otherwise relevant (Motion Tr. 
2/12/90 at 20). Finding nothing exculpatory or relevant, the 
court granted defendant access to the diary for the periods in 
which he had contact with Debbie and her sons but denied access 
to the remainder of the dairy (R. 543). 
Without further objection at trial, Debbie testified 
that after she was contacted in Bountiful concerning an autopsy, 
defendant told her that the police were not questioning her 
actions but were questioning him. Defendant said that the 
bruises on Mikie looked suspicious and that if Debbie was looking 
for "something bad," she would find it. He said he had read her 
journal and that she had recorded some of their fights. 
Defendant told her that if the police found the journal that 
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those entries would be "probable cause" to demand an autopsy. 
Defendant asked if he could "rip out" those pages. Debbie 
agreed. Defendant left the roomf came back and said that he had 
destroyed the pages (T. 228-29). Debbie was then asked if 
defendant had told her specifically the contents of the pages. A 
general objection was made and overruled (T. 229). Debbie 
responded that while she did not remember specifically what she 
had written, the fights were about disciplining her children 
including the incident where defendant had kicked Mikie and left 
bruises on "his butt" (T. 229). Subsequently, Mike Hines 
testified that defendant admitted that he had torn a page out of 
the dairy relating to his having kicked and bruised Mikie (T. 
601). 
Relying on cases involving the admission of documents, 
defendant argues that Debbie's testimony was untrustworthy (Br. 
of App. at 39). Such an argument is totally inapplicable because 
the diary was never admitted into evidence nor did the court 
allow Debbie to reconstruct the contents of the diary. All that 
was admitted was her accounting of defendant's statements and 
conduct concerning his reasons for wanting some entries 
destroyed. She clearly stated that she did not specifically 
remember what she had written but she knew the fights referred to 
were their fights over the children. This was not new factual 
information; Debbie had already testified to defendant's 
admissions that he had kicked Mikie (T. 198-202). Instead, the 
relevancy of the testimony was that after Mikie died, defendant 
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destroyed evidence which he believed was inculpatory. As this 
Court has previously determined, 
Like resisting or attempting to bribe an 
arresting officer, such conduct is relevant 
as an admission by conduct, "constituting 
circumstantial evidence of consciousness of 
guilt" (citation omitted). 
State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 65 (Utah 1983). Accord State v. 
Walker, 595 P.2d 1098, 1100 (Kan. 1979). 
POINT VI 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL, TOGETHER 
WITH ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES, IS SUFFICIENT 
TO SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR MURDER 
IN THE SECOND DEGREE; THEREFORE, THE COURT 
PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS, MOTION FOR AN ARREST OF JUDGMENT, 
AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
In attacking the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant 
concedes that the evidence at trial established that Mikie 
suffered a pattern of abuse at defendant's hands for the 
approximate two and one-half months they were together. Further, 
defendant concedes that Mikie died a non-accidental death due to 
suffocation while alone with defendant (Br. of App. at 40). 
Defendant asserts, however, that the evidence also supports the 
inference that Mikie died from choking on a piece of candy (Br. 
of App. at 40-41, 43). From this, defendant argues that the lack 
of a conclusive anatomical cause of death renders the evidence 
insufficient for a murder in the second degree conviction but 
that it could be sufficient for a manslaughter conviction (Br. of 
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App. at 41-43). This argument misconstrues the law and facts.20 
As conceded by defendant, the evidence clearly 
established that Mikie did not die of natural causes. All the 
doctors agreed that the physical evidence was consistent with 
Mikie having died from a lack of oxygen caused by suffocation. 
Despite defendant's assertions to the contrary, the doctors did 
not testify that it was equally plausible that Mikie choked to 
death. No evidence was found of obstruction in his airway at the 
time of resuscitation nor was any internal swelling, consistent 
with choking, found in his throat during autopsy (T. 4(53-64, 471, 
538-39, 541, 553). Instead, the bruising and fingernail marks 
indicated that a hand had been held over Mikie's face and that, 
from the time period involved and the lack of other physical 
indica, the medical evidence would support that Mikie had been 
intentionally suffocated by an adult (T. 467-69, 552-57). Even 
if, arguendo, defendant's proposition that Mikie choked had some 
factually validity, it would not necessarily remove this case 
from murder in the second degree for the jury could have still 
rationally concluded that Mikie choked to death while being 
physically abused by defendant. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(d). 
Defendant also argues that the trial court 
improperly denied his motions to dismiss for insufficient 
20
 Neither defendant's brief statement of facts nor his 
recitation of the evidence under his sufficiency argument met the 
marshalling standard enunciated in Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). This failure should preclude review of 
any insufficiency claim on appeal. In the alternative, the state 
will discuss the merits of defendant's claim. 
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evidence. A comparable standard of review applies to a motion to 
dismiss based on insufficient evidence as to an insufficiency 
claim based on a jury verdict. In both, the trial court's 
decision should be upheld "if, upon reviewing the evidence and 
all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [the 
appellate court] conclude[s] that some evidence exists from which 
a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Dibello, 780 
P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1S89). 
Here, the evidence established that defendant met 
Debbie in September and moved in with her by October. As soon as 
Mikie was left alone with defendant, Mikie began sustaining 
injuries. The explanations given by defendant to Debbie for the 
injuries were found not to be consistent with the nature of the 
injuries discovered at autopsy (T. 446, 465-66, 471, 531-32, 584, 
670). Mikie's brother and cousin both observed defendant injure 
Mikie. Defendant, while minimizing the nature of the acts, 
admitted to Debbie and subsequently to an investigator that he 
had kicked and hit Mikie. Medical evidence confirmed that 
Mikie's injuries were consistent with those of a battered child. 
Two days before Mikie's death, defendant attempted to strangle 
Mikie because he would not stop crying. This was done by hanging 
him from his coat until Mikie's eyes bulged, he became limp and 
appeared not to be breathing. When Debbie intervened, defendant 
did not readily release the child but angrily stated that he did 
not care if the child could not breathe (T. 209-11). Shortly 
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after, defendant told Mikie that he hated him (T. 214). 
The next time that defendant was alone with Mikie, 
Mikie died. Medical evidence excluded any natural cause of death 
(T. 437). The state and defense experts agreed that the physical 
findings indicated that shortly before his death, Mikie was 
backhanded by an adult with sufficient force to fracture one cf 
his ribs. The experts agreed that an unusually located bruise 
under Mikie's chin and adult fingernail marks next to his eye 
also indicated that shortly before his death, an adult held his 
hand(s) over the child's mouth and nose with significant 
pressure. See Statement of Facts, infra, at 13-18. 
The fact that defendant had been inflicting abuse on 
Mikie for two months prior to his death and that Mikie died from 
a non-accidental injury while in defendant's sole custody would 
suffice for conviction. Accord State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d at 550-
51. However, there was additional evidence to support 
defendant's conviction. Immediately after Mikie's death, 
defendant destroyed evidence which he characterized as 
inculpatory (T. 228-29). When he learned that Debbie intended to 
have Mikie's body exhumed and an autopsy performed, defendant 
became angry and said that Debbie was trying to make him look bad 
(T. 233). When told by an investigator of the state's theory 
that defendant had intentionally suffocated Mikie, defendant 
stated that he could not believe that the investigator "had 
figured it out" (T. 603-04). He then modified his response by 
admitting that he had hit Mikie with a blow of sufficient force 
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to fracture his rib and Mikie, without choking or coughing, just 
fell limp into his arms (T. 605). Defendant further admitted 
that he had given inconsistent statements at various times 
concerning how Mikie had died (T. 813). Based on the evidence, 
the jury had a substantial factual basis from which it could 
conclude that defendant murdered Mikie by intentionally 
suffocating him. Accord State v. Phillips, 399 S.E.2d 293; State 
v. Holland, 346 N.W.2d 302 (S.D. 1984); Schleret v. State, 311 
N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 1981). 
Similarly, defendant argues that the court improperly 
denied his motion to arrest judgment (Br. of App., Point VI(B), 
at 44). Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in pertinent 
part, allows an arrest of judgment "if the facts proved or 
admitted do not constitute a public offense . . . or there is 
other good cause." Defendant asserts that the evidence at trial 
was insufficient to establish a public offense. For the same 
reasons discussed above, the evidence was sufficient for 
conviction. Therefore, there was no basis to arrest judgment. 
State v. Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989). 
Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly 
denied his motion for new trial based on claims of insufficient 
evidence and the admission of the rule 404 (b) evidence relating 
to prior instances of abuse (Br. of App., Point VI(C) at 45). 
This Court has recently clarified that "a trial court's decision 
to deny a new trial will be upheld if there is a reasonable basis 
to support that decision." Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 
59 
164 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (Utah June 28, 1991). In this regard, 
"a trial judge may not substitute his judgment for the jury; •• 
rather, before a new trial would be appropriate, "the trial judge 
must be able to articulate a reasonable basis for the 
inappropriateness of the verdict." Id. at 18 n.31. Here, the 
court properly concluded that the interests of justice did not 
require a new trial (R. 660). 
POINT VII 
THE CONCEPT OF CUMULATIVE ERROR DOES NOT 
APPLY WHERE NO SUBSTANTIAL ERRORS WERE 
COMMITTED. 
As a catch-all to his other arguments, defendant argues 
that he should be granted a new trial on the basis of the 
cumulative errors committed by the trial court. However, the 
concept of cumulative error is only applicable where substantial, 
multiple errors have in fact been committed. State v. Ellis, 748 
P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1987). Here, no substantial errors were 
committed and the doctrine does not apply. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction for 
murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s dJtffftJday of September, 
1991. 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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